This article investigates to what extent social democratic parties still benefit from the support of union members at the polls. Not only are social democratic parties confronted with new competitors in the party systems, but also the union confederations of the socialist labour movement are in some countries losing their dominant position due to the rise of separate professional confederations. We argue that the effect of union membership on voting choice is conditioned by the structure of the trade union movement. The support of union members for social democracy is fostered by the strength of the confederations historically close to this party family, while it is hampered when strong separate (or politically unaffiliated) whitecollar confederations exist. Using European Social Survey and Swedish Public Opinion data, we show that social democratic parties still enjoy an important support from trade union members, but at the same time are under fierce competition from bourgeois and green parties among members of white-collar confederations. This reinforces the challenges for social democracy to build new voters' coalitions in post-industrial societies.
Introduction
Historically, trade unions and social democratic parties were closely linked. They find their origins in the same movement. Social democratic parties acted as the political arm of the labour movement, while unions were the economic arm of the labour movement (Ebbinghaus, 1995) . Over the last years, the relationships between these two components were far from harmonious (e.g. Allern, Aylott and Christiansen, 2007) , even leading in some countries to the formation of new parties, for example Die Linke in Germany (e.g. Nachtwey and Spier, 2007) . While many recent contributions have focused on the difficulty for social democratic parties to mobilize their working-class constituencies (Arzheimer, 2013; e.g. Arndt, 2014; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015; Rennwald, 2015) , little is known on the support from trade union members.
Does social democracy still benefit from the support of this core clientele and which competitors does it face? This article proposes the first updated comparative analysis on the voting choice of union members in Western Europe. Despite the significant decrease of unionization in industrialized countries (see Pontusson, 2013) , union members still do represent a non-negligible share of the electorate (e.g. 17.7% of wage-earners in Germany, 25.4% in United Kingdom or 66.8% in Denmark (OECD.Stat, 2013)) 1 . As Streeck and Hassel (2003) notice, social democratic parties have often tried not to appear too close to trade unions, but at the same time still need the support of this constituency to win elections.
Two elements require a careful investigation. On the one hand, European party systems have grown more diverse with the rise of new left-wing parties (Greens and radical left) and radical right-wing parties. While the literature on electoral realignments and class voting has long taken this new configuration into account (for a literature review see Häusermann, Picot and Geering, 2013), we do not have much information on the behaviour of union members in transformed party systems. On the other hand, with the change of the employment structure, unions organize not only the manual workers, but also increasingly (albeit not without difficulty), the higher-skilled white-collar workers. The organization of white-collar workers displays a strong cross-national variation. As put it by Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000: 54) , "between countries with similar transformations in the class structure and similar shares of white-collar employment, we find significant differences in the pattern of organization and affiliation of white-collar employees and their unions". However, to our knowledge, no comparative analysis has ever examined the effect of the diversified union landscape on electoral behaviour.
We therefore argue that the structure of the trade union movement represents an important (but of course not the sole) variable conditioning the impact of union membership on voting choice. More specifically, the relative strength of the different trade union confederations moderates the effect of union membership. The support of union members for social democracy is fostered by the strength of the confederations historically close to this party family, while it is hampered when strong separate (or politically unaffiliated) whitecollar confederations exist. This specific variation highlights some opportunities and limitations (among many others) for the labour movement in times of changing employment structure.
The present article delivers above all an empirical contribution given the aim of providing a European overview on the topic. It contributes also to the debate on the future of social democracy (see Kitschelt, 1994) . A careful investigation of changes in class cleavage requires not only the study of its social basis, but also of its organizational component, and how the two might evolve independently from one another (Bartolini and Mair, [2007] 1990: 202-203) . By studying the persistence or break of the party-union linkage in the electoral arena, this study constitutes a first step towards this ambitious goal.
The paper is structured in the following way. The first two sections discuss the relevant literature on organized labour and present the hypotheses, first related to party system, second related to union structure. After the research design, the first empirical section presents the voting choice of union members in Europe and how it is conditioned by union structure. In the second empirical section, we show with Sweden as an illustrative case that the presence of specific white-collar confederations does not always bring an electoral advantage for social democracy.
The distinct vote choice of union members in a new party landscape
A vast literature deals with the impact of unionization on the decision to participate in elections (for a literature review, see Pontusson, 2013: 807-809 Parsons, 2015) .
Why should union members be more likely to support specific parties? It is possible to consider this question under several perspectives. Firstly, the vote of union members can be understood as the product of the specific relationship between the two arms of the labour movement (social democratic party and trade union). Changes in this relationship should be reflected at the level of individual voting behaviour. Secondly, it is possible to emphasize the political attitudes of union members making them more likely to support specific parties.
Thirdly, as unions represent the organizational component of the class cleavage (Bartolini and Mair, [2007] 1990) , it is possible to emphasize the parties' positioning and strategies on socio-economic issues and their potential impact on union members voting choice (for the "top-down" approach on social class, see Evans and De Graaf, 2013) . We briefly discuss these three elements and derive our hypotheses.
There is a widespread impression that the relationships between social democratic parties and trade unions have changed over the last years. However, the systematic empirical studies conducted display a nuanced picture. In Scandinavia for example, Allern et al. (2007) find deep changes in Denmark, but not in Norway or Sweden. Reviewing existing studies, Allern and Bale (2012: 14) emphasize the strong cross-national variation in the changes of party-union relations, and more generally the strong variety of linkages at stake. In their study on unions in ten Western European countries, Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013: 138) also come to a similar conclusion: even though the authors emphasize the fragility of partyunion ties, there is in their view "no uniform process of distancing or divorce but strong crossnational variation".
Scholars have demonstrated the specific political attitudes of union members. Mosimann and Pontusson (2014) show that union members are more likely to support redistribution than other citizens. The effect is not due to the fact that individuals supporting redistribution are more likely to join unions. The authors convincingly show that there is a clear direction in this relationship. The fact of being member of a trade union generates a sense of solidarity with individuals of different income levels. Based on this, union members should be more likely to support parties advocating redistributive policies, which is the historical legacy of left-wing parties. But to what extent do social democratic parties benefit from a clear advantage compared to their competitors of the left-wing camp? Let's now discuss the positioning and strategies of parties on socio-economic issues.
The growing competition of radical left-wing parties is in some countries directly related to divergences between social democratic parties and unions. The latter went to increasingly criticize the political choices of social democratic parties, this especially when they were in power in several Western European countries in the late 1990s and beginning 2000s. Thus, we expect social democratic parties to be in fierce competition with radical leftwing parties among union members. By contrast, the Greens find their origins in the criticism of the Keynesian (productivist) class compromise of the Post-World War advocated by both social democratic parties and unions (see Sassoon, 1996: 647-690 associations. However, recent literature has shown how radical right-wing parties strategically blur their positioning on economic and social policy (Rovny, 2013; Afonso, 2015 
The impact of union membership in diverse union structures
We have started from the idea that unions represent the economic arm of the labour movement. However, there exists a large variety of unions with different political conceptions and linkages with political parties, without mentioning the presence of Communist dominated unions in countries where the left was divided and the variety of (social democratic or labour) party-union relationships (Ebbinghaus, 1995) . Historically, Christian unions had developed as competitors of the socialist labour movement inside the working class (Pasture, 2002) .
Additionally, white-collar unions have formed in several countries in order to represent the interests of white-collar workers, seen as distinct from those of blue-collar workers.
Taking into account this diversity, we therefore argue that the impact of union membership on voting behaviour is conditioned by the union structure existing in a country.
The support for social democracy is likely to be affected by the strength of the different confederations. We focus here on the level of confederations, since the more or less formalized relationships between political parties and unions take generally place at this level.
Not all confederations have the same linkages with social democratic parties. Moreover, some confederations organize specific segments of the workforce and this might impact on the conceptions of solidarity among their members. This element takes an increasing importance with the growth of white-collar employment.
With its "most class-segmented union movement in the world" (Kjellberg, 2013: 6) , the Swedish case illustrates very well the challenges that the socialist labour movement faces.
The blue-collar union confederation (LO), which is close to the Swedish social democratic party (SAP), has lost relatively weight within the union movement. While LO organized 78% of all union members in Sweden in 1950, it organizes only 44% of union members in 2013, the lowest share ever reached (Kjellberg, 2013: 8) . The shift has helped the growth of two other confederations, the university-educated professionals (Saco) and the other white-collar workers (TCO). In 2013 Saco organizes 17% of all union members, while TCO organizes 36%. Both confederations stress their political independence, but historically the SAP had closer links to the TCO than to the Saco.
The existence of separate confederations based on class constitutes an extreme case that can be found above all in Scandinavia. An intermediate case would be that both blue-collar and white-collar unions co-exist, but that they are reunited in the same confederation. At the other end, the most cohesive representation of all wage-earners exists in the case of vertical unions (industrial unionism), with all wage-earners of a company organized in the same union, irrespective of their class or function (Höpflinger, 1980: 37-38) . The presence of separate confederations does not mean that they are necessarily adversary, but it indicates nevertheless a need for a certain differentiation in the representation of wage-earners.
Scholars have warned against overestimating the peculiarities of white-collar unionism which is very diverse (e.g. Blackburn and Prandy, 1965; Crompton, 1976) . However, they have also emphasized some distinct characteristics of white-collar unions especially when they organize wage-earners of a specific profession. In this case, they come closer to professional associations whose one characteristic is to "restrict entry to a profession in order to protect its status and prevent downwards wage pressure" (Kjellberg, 2013: 35) . Moreover, when they organize exclusively wage-earners with a higher status or a position close to the management, unions can develop a different ideological profile with a less contentious vision of the employment relations, more emphasis on representation than bargaining and a lower level of militancy (Blackburn and Prandy, 1965) . A recent study on the confederation of managerial staff in France (CFE-CGC) shows well the collaborative vision of union work among the members, as well as the reticence of the use of the strike (Béthoux, et al., 2013) .
A decisive contribution by Mosimann and Pontusson (2014) 
H4: Strong independent academic and professional union confederations reduce the vote of union members for social democracy, but increase the vote for centre-right and green parties.

Research design and data
We combine a comparative study of 16 European countries in 2002-2010 with a crosstemporal case study of Sweden in the period 1986-2012. 2 The comparative study allows testing the effect of union membership (micro-level) in diverse union structures (macro-level) with multilevel models. Given the differences in historical trajectories, we focus on West European countries. For union structure, we make use of the Jelle Visser's (2013) data base
Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social
Pacts , 1960 , -2011 . We then combine it with the European Social Survey (ESS)   3 2002-2010 which contains an item on current union membership and various controls. It also allows operationalizing class position through the Oesch-class schema (Oesch, 2006) .
In Sweden, we can study the membership in different confederations directly at the micro-level on the basis of the annual Riks-SOM surveys (Weibull, et al., 2014) . The crosstemporal case study therefore provides a second test of our hypotheses to substantiate the results of the multilevel models. In the comparative study, we show that the strength of professional/academic confederations plays at the disadvantage of social democracy. With the case study, we can show more in detail with whom social democracy is in competition, this over a long time period. The Swedish case is also important from a substantial point of view.
It demonstrates well the importance of making further differentiations across union confederations. This holds particularly true for Scandinavian countries where class-based confederations exist in a high union density context fostered by the Ghent unemployment insurance system 4 (Ebbinghaus, Göbel and Koos, 2011) .
Operationalization of union structure with the ICTWSS data
We coded the different union confederations (peak organisations) in every country into six categories. We then calculated the share of the union members organized through the confederation as their strength and as measure for union structure. The six categories are "social democratic", "public sector/white-collar", "academic/professional", "Christian", "communist", and "other". The categorization includes both the traditional competitors for the labour movement, i.e. the Christian and the communist confederations, as well as the confederations of white-collar workers which are of special interest in this article due to the changes of the employment structure.
The category "social democratic" includes those confederations that have a dominant position within the union system and that are traditionally and predominantly linked to the social democratic party such as the Austrian ÖGB, the British TUC or the Swedish LO. We cannot do full justice to the large diversity of confederations and of their linkages with (social democratic) parties across Europe. For example, in Austria, political factions play an important role within the ÖGB structure (Ebbinghaus, 2000: 84-85) . In Great Britain, not all TUC member organizations are affiliated to the Labour Party, but it is the case of a large majority of them (representing 69% of all TUC members).
The category "academic/professional" includes those federations that are not part of the dominant social democratic umbrella organization and (mainly) represent academics, professionals, and executive managers, predominantly in the private sector. The Finnish AKAVA or the Swedish SACO are examples. The public sector confederations are those that are independent of the social democratic confederation and mainly organize white-collar workers in the public sector (for example the German Beamtenbund). In Scandinavia, the confederations of this category bring together both public and private sector white-collar workers (for example the TCO in Sweden). The full classification appears in Table A .1 in the appendix.
The six variables contain thus the share of labour organized under a particular confederation. For instance, the value for the social democratic organization in Austria is 1.00 or 100% since Austria has only one peak organization which is predominantly close to the social democratic party. The value for academic/professional confederations for Finland is 0.217 or 21.7% since the independent union confederation AKAVA organized more than Case study : Sweden 1985 : Sweden -2010 We use the Swedish Riks-SOM surveys which are annual opinion polls on a variety of economic, social, and political issues conducted since 1986. 6 We use the "Super Riks-SOM 1986-2012" (SND-0905), a pooled dataset containing all surveys (Weibull, et al., 2014) . It includes an item that asked the respondents whether they were member of a trade union with four response options 1 "yes, member of a union organized under LO", 2 "yes, member of a union organized under TCO", 3 "yes, member of a union organized under SACO", and 4 "not a trade union member". This is to our knowledge the best available item in election studies to capture union membership in different confederations over a longer time span in Western countries. We ran a multinomial logit model with vote choice in election years as dependent variable and interactions between union confederation membership and year as main independent variables (e.g. TCO*year). These results will be presented as predicted party choice over the different union confederations in the period 1985-2010 controlled for class, age, education, sector, and sex.
Comparative analysis of the vote choice of trade union members
We used a stepwise model building strategy and began with multilevel logit models that contained only individual level variables as well as two basic macro-level controls (union density and Ghent system). We then added our measures for union structure and finally interacted union membership with the three relevant union confederations. We start by examining the vote choice of union members for the different parties (Hypotheses 1 and 2).
We then add the cross-level interactions to demonstrate how the vote of union members is conditioned by the strength of the different confederations (Hypotheses 3 and 4) . The results for the interactions will be visualised, since their interpretation in logistic models is not always straightforward (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006; Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010) . The coefficients for these models appear in the online appendix A. Turning to the different party contrasts, we can see that union members are significantly less likely to vote for centre-right parties over social democratic parties (M3). They are also significantly less likely to support the radical right (M7). The coefficient is even slightly stronger than in the case of the centre-right speaking against Hypothesis 2a.
The continuing preference of union members for the left
Union membership significantly decreases the support for the Greens over social democracy (M5), but the effect is weaker than in the case of the centre-right. Contrarily to all other party contrasts examined, the radical left does not show significant differences to social democracy among union members (M9). The disadvantage of the Greens among union members and the competition from the radical left speaks in favour of our Hypothesis 2b.
Generally, the radical left comes closest to social democracy in its electoral profile, since it has the lowest number of significant predictors in our analysis (also regarding the controls).
Finally, looking at the macro-level control of union density, the pattern is the same as for union membership at the individual level.
Next, we briefly examine the models including the trade union structure at the macrolevel (M2, M4, M6, M8, M10). The effect of union membership on party choice remains unchanged. However, it is interesting to note that the significant effect of union density disappears once we introduce the more detailed union structure in M2 (also in M6 and M8).
This means that union density alone is no powerful predictor of social democracy's strength once we control for the diversity of trade union confederations. Always at the macro-level, M2 demonstrate that the strength of the different confederations play a role in the support for social democracy. A high membership share in the confederation traditionally linked to social democracy is significantly beneficial for social democracy, which provides some first evidence for Hypothesis 3. Strong public sector confederations also provide an important mobilisation base for social democracy. In contrast, 7 Full tables appear in the online appendix A.
13 strong academic/professional confederations exhibit a disadvantage for social democratic parties since the coefficient is highly negative in M2, which provides some first evidence for 14 Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Controls for age, class, education, religion and sex not shown. -38,069.75 -25,992.66 -25,038.47 -11,330.27 -10,918.12 -7,787.58 -7,545.76 -7,848.27 -7,497 .39 Chi-square test of rho=0 2,349.5*** 974.8*** 1,291.1*** 690.1*** 1,553.4*** 1,303.9*** 4,960.9*** 1,344.2*** 2,330.4*** 1,378.5***
When specific confederations boost the support of union members for the right
We now turn to the analyses containing the cross-level interactions between the three confederations of interest and union membership. To reiterate, the rationale is to inspect whether union members' voting behaviour is conditioned by the varying strength of social democratic, public sector, and academic professional union federations. Figure 2 begins with plotting the predicted probabilities for the contrast social democrats versus all other parties (see Table A1 The left-hand side shows surprisingly that support for centre-right parties among union members does not diminish with increasing strength of traditional social democratic unionsa result that already occurred in Model 4 in Table 1 . By contrast, the results for the middle panel indicate as previously that the public sector federations work as a mobilisation base for social democracy.
Finally, the right-hand panel shows that strong academic union federations increase the vote for the centre-right vis-à-vis social democracy. A unionized manager has a probability of around 28 percent to vote for the centre-right if there is no independent academic federation (as is the case in Austria), but has a probability of more than 70 percent to support the centre- Furthermore, Figure 5a also reveals that the conservative Moderate Party has become rival for the SAP among LO members. This is consistent with the cross-country study which showed that the support for centre-right parties among union members did not diminish with increasing strength of social democratic confederations. However, the pattern is clearer in the case of the Swedish Left Party, since it increases its vote shares only among LO members. This is in line with Hypothesis 2b 9 and previous research which demonstrated that the radical left has gained strength among disillusioned social democratic constituencies (Arndt, 2013; Karreth, Polk and Allen, 2013) . Source: Multinomial logit models with Riks-SOM surveys 1985 -2010 ). Y-axis shows predicted vote shares for parties in percent. Models include class, age, education, private-public sector and sex as controls and fixed at means or modes. ND: Ny Demokrati, SD: Sverigedemokraterna. We have shown here the party preferences of the "average" union member in three different confederations. In order to show that the presence of separate white-collar confederations really makes a difference at the individual level, we further interacted union confederation membership with social class (see online appendix C). Let's take as example a person from the lower salariat which forms an ideal recruitment target for white-collar unions. Indeed, this social class is predominantly organized in the TCO with 37% (average for the entire period), but also to some extent in the Saco (19%) and in LO (6%). The predicted probabilities (left-hand panel of Figure   C1 in online appendix C) show that members of the lower salariat have a strong propensity to vote for the SAP and a weak propensity to vote for the Moderates if organized under LO. The pattern is completely reversed if the person is organized under Saco -he/she votes in a similar way as a non-member. This is not the case if the person is organized under the other white-collar confederation. Among the lower salariat organized under TCO, the SAP still has a significant advantage over the Moderates, but the pattern is weaker compared to the LO. These findings suggest the existence of context effects beyond the pure differences in who is the "average" union member 10 .
Conclusion
This article has investigated the electoral behaviour of trade union members in a comparative perspective. We have argued that union membership at the individual level is still beneficial for social democracy at the ballots. However, we have pleaded at the same time to pay more attention to the diversity of trade union landscapes. We therefore argued that union membership as a resource for social democracy depends on the union structure.
On the one hand, our findings based on a comparative study of 16 European countries reveal a strong left-right structuration in the party preferences of union members. Despite difficult relationships between the two arms of the labour movement, union members are still more supportive of social democratic parties. Radical left parties benefit equally from the support of union members, while the Greens stay slightly behind. Organized workers are less likely to support centre-right parties, and even less likely to support the radical right-wing parties. While several studies over the last years pointed to the capacity of radical right-wing parties to gain new support among the traditional constituencies of the left (working class), the same is not true if we consider the organizational element of the class cleavage. This suggests that organized workers are less likely be "disturbed" by the cultural appeals of the radical right (e.g. on immigration)
which has proved to be decisive in the support for this party family (Ivarsflaten, 2005; e.g. Oesch, 2008a ).
On the other hand, our findings showed that the support of union members varies depending on the union structure and can take unexpected forms. It is particularly the presence of academic/professional confederations that matters. The comparative study indicated that bourgeois and to a lesser extent Green parties gain momentum among union members in countries with strong separate professional confederations. In contrast, the presence of public/white-collar confederations clearly fosters the support for social democracy. Based on detailed information on the affiliation into different confederations, the case study on Sweden permitted to further illustrate the different party preferences of union members and their over- Our article has focused on the vote choice of union members and how it varies across party systems and trade union contexts given the lack of current knowledge on this matter. Further research should devote more attention to the underlying mechanisms that we did not test.
Particularly, further research should show what exactly makes union members more likely to stick to the left parties and to dislike the radical right, also by including parties' and unions' positions on both economic and cultural issues as a further conditioning variable. We should also more precisely analyse why specific white-collar confederations (e.g. Saco) do not foster the support for social democracy. Our results are ambivalent for social democracy in the context of the growth of white-collar employment. The membership in a white-collar confederation such as TCO in Sweden does not make such a big difference for social democracy in terms of electoral mobilization as compared to a "traditional" blue-collar confederation. The prospects are less good among members of professional and academic confederations where the deployment of the values of the labour movement seems to be more a challenge. Visser's (2013) . We used the variables SCf11 to SCf18. Notes: The category "other" applies to all other independent and non-classifiable confederations if not mentioned otherwise; the merger of non-SGB unions in Switzerland requires only two categories in Swiss case after 2001, there would be more confederations if using data before 2002; the German DAG is not included as public sector as it merged into VERDI and joined the DGB in 2001/02; data for Portuguese USI are missing. 
